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UNDUE BURDENS IN TEXAS
Jennifer S. Hendricks
In 2007 and 2008, I spent about six weeks living on a visitor's chair
in my mother's hospital room, where she was being treated for cancer.
Her treatment was overseen by at least five different doctors simulta-
neously, none of whom, so far as I could tell, ever spoke to each other
about her. They communicated through me and regularly counter-
manded each other; each time a doctor scribbled something on the
chart and departed, I was left to negotiate with the nurses how to in-
tegrate the new dictates into the old. My mother was well-off and had
excellent health insurance, but that didn't prevent her sickness and its
treatment from being carved into pieces and distributed by specialty.
Despite having the same five doctors over the course of most of her
stay, she did not have continuity of care.
In fighting tooth and nail against Obamacare, the State of Texas is
on the front lines in the defense of the American people's right to some
of the worst health care practices in the developed world, including the
lack of continuity of care that people less well-off than my mother
experience more acutely as they are shuffled through the health care
bureaucracy
Except, of course, when it comes to abortion, where states like Tex-
as are all about raising the standard of care, at least if doing so in-
creases cost and decreases access. Hence the Texas legislature's sud-
den interest in continuity of care for women who have abortions,
embodied in its new rule that any doctor performing an abortion must
have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where the
abortion is performed. Everything's bigger - and farther away - in
Texas, but only women having abortions have been singled out with such
concern, purportedly aimed at making sure the doctor who performed the
abortion will be available for follow-up if there are complications.
Of course, we all know the real motivation for the new law, a type
of law so common there's an acronym for it - a TRAP, or Targeted
Regulation of Abortion Providers. The purpose of a TRAP is to make
abortion more expensive and more difficult to obtain or provide.
Some TRAPs are aimed at the internal workings of an abortion clinic,
such as special rules for how the building is constructed or maintained.
Others directly regulate patient care, usually by requiring medically
unnecessary procedures such as STD tests or, more recently, an ultra-
sound twenty-four hours before the abortion. In addition to increasing
the cost of providing abortions, TRAPs increase opportunities for state
oversight and inspection of clinics. While Texas's thirty-mile law had
the most dramatic effect - numerous clinics closing abruptly when
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the law went into effect - TRAPs have gradually eaten away at abor-
tion access for the last two decades. One anti-abortion group claims
that 72% of the nation's abortion clinics have closed since 1991, the
year before Planned Parenthood v. Casey replaced strict scrutiny of
abortion restrictions with the "undue burden" standard.
Speaking of Casey: One might say that the purpose of TRAPs
is to place substantial obstacles in the path of women who are seeking
abortions. And there is no doubt that this is the effect. Why then are
they not struck down under Casey, which purports to proscribe exactly
that purpose and exactly that effect?
The Fifth Circuit is currently reviewing the thirty-mile rule in
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas v. Abbott, but both that court
and the Supreme Court have already tipped their hands in the course
of ruling on whether the law could go into effect despite a district
court's conclusion that it is unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit entered
a stay pending appeal, thereby allowing the law to take effect, holding
that the State was likely to prevail on the merits; the Supreme Court
affirmed, brushing aside concerns about the status quo and triggering
the closure of at least a dozen Texas clinics.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion is a case study in how the courts have
turned the undue burden standard into carte blanche to chip away at
women's access to abortion, first by effectively eliminating the "pur-
pose" prong and second by analyzing the "effects" of abortion restric-
tions in a narrow, abstract way instead of by looking at actual effects
on women's lives.
First, even though the undue burden test refers to both "purpose"
and "effect," the Fifth Circuit looked at the law's purpose only through
the lens of rational basis review, invoking a generous version of that
standard: the legislature's claimed purpose for the law was not to be
subjected to "courtroom factfinding" and could be based on "rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." The court
thus accepted without question that Texas's only concern was to pre-
vent "patient abandonment" by irresponsible abortionists who direct
their patients to emergency rooms, rather than back to the clinic, to
deal with complications. This vision of the doctor-patient relationship
evokes Roe itself, which imagined the woman in deep consultation
with a personal physician, who knew enough about not only her phys-
ical health but also her entire life circumstances to make the abortion
decision for her. It is a remarkably unrealistic description of the health
care experienced by the vast majority of women in the U.S. and could
not plausibly have explained the law, let alone outweighed the law's
practical effects, if the "purpose" prong of the undue burden standard
were taken seriously.
Second, turning to the "effects" of the Texas law, the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Abbott is typical of post-Casey analyses of abortion restric-
tions in its utter lack of empathy for poor and rural women. This dis-
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regard for practicalities appears to be enabled by a background under-
standing about the state action doctrine: despite the practical-sounding
text of the undue burden test, whether a burden is "undue" is assessed
with the assumption that background realities like poverty or distance
from a hospital can be ignored. This framework allows the "purpose
and effect" of state action to be judged only according to its impact on
the most privileged members of society The need to travel long dis-
tances for an abortion is a problem only if one has a problem like lack
of money for a hotel room, lack of a car or gas to put in it, or a job
that does not let you take a few days off whenever you need to.
Courts like the Fifth Circuit look at such a scenario and blame the in-
ability to get an abortion on poverty rather than on the law that ex-
ploits poverty to limit access to abortion.
Third, although lower courts occasionally mention that the cumula-
tive effects of multiple TRAPs could eventually become an undue bur-
den, they have yet to articulate how to know when that point has been
reached. In Texas, the Fifth Circuit not only failed to examine the
thirty-mile rule in light of how difficult it already was to get an abor-
tion in Texas; the judges actually used that fact to help justify uphold-
ing the law. When the plaintiffs pointed out that women in twenty-
four counties in the Rio Grande Valley would be cut off from access to
abortion by the law, the court responded that abortion was only avail-
able in thirteen out of 254 counties in Texas anyway, so what did it
matter?
Although disagreeing with particular applications, the liberals on
the Supreme Court have not attacked the fundamental flaws in the
undue burden standard and how it is applied in cases like Abbott. In
Abbott, the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to let the law to go into effect.
Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by his three female colleagues,
and had this to say about Texas's chances of prevailing on the merits:
whether the thirty-mile rule is constitutional, he said, is "a difficult
question." As Justice Scalia pointed out, that wasn't enough to justify
reversal of the Fifth Circuit's order. More importantly, the only way
to make this a difficult question is to ignore the "purpose" prong of the
undue burden test and to acquiesce to the Fifth Circuit's anemic "ef-
fect" analysis.
The only time the Supreme Court has found a TRAP to be un-
constitutional was the husband-notification struck down in Casey,
which may well be the least substantial obstacle, in practical terms,
that the Court has ever considered. Obnoxious, condescending, and
sexist? Yes. But insurmountable? Not nearly so much as parental no-
tification, waiting periods, or long-distance travel. Meanwhile, the
Guttmacher Institute recently announced that more restrictions on
abortion were enacted in 20i1-2013 than in the entire previous decade.
This is not surprising. The culture war alternates between two over-
lapping fronts - women and gays. Right and left are rapidly reaching
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dtente over same-sex marriage: suddenly, everybody loves to be in
love, especially if it's married love. It's been lovely. But women,
watch out.
